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Introduction
 It has been some time since the concept of global commons emerged in 
social science.1 In the current security debate between Japan and the United 
States, there seems to be a tacit understanding that the Arctic Ocean is a 
global commons similar to cyberspace and outer space【Map 1】.2 However, 
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whether this is a well-established concept is a critical question in need of a 
fresh evaluation. The notion of a global commons still raises a wide range 
of ambiguous points for discussion, regardless of its general definition from 
the viewpoint of military security. In the fields of international law and 
international relations, strictly speaking, the term global commons remains to 
be clearly defined, although doing so may pose a challenge.3
 Some commentators in Japan have recently invoked the idea of global 
commons, particularly in the context of security and the Japan-US alliance,4 at 
the core of which is the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty.5 Many analysts today 
agree that the security environment surrounding Japan is drastically changing.
【Map 1】
Source: ‘The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030’, 2014, p. 5.
Arctic Ocean（United States Navy graphic）
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 Carefully considering the legal significance of cyberspace and outer 
space is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be dealt with here.6 This 
paper has two primary goals: （1） Examining the general concept of global 
commons under international law and comparing it to the legal status of the 
Arctic Ocean; and （2） Japan’s attitude toward the Arctic Ocean and its policy 
with special reference to the applicability of the current argument considering 
the Arctic Ocean as a global commons similar to cyberspace and outer space 
regarding security.7
 For the purpose of this article, the Arctic Ocean is defined as the 
maritime area which surrounds the North Pole within the limit of the Arctic 
Circle （an imaginary line of latitude located at 66 degrees 33 minutes north） 
and which neighbours the coasts of Canada, the United States, Denmark 
（Greenland）, Norway, and Russia.8 
Ⅰ． The Notion of Global Commons and Some Similar but 
Different Ideas
 The notion of a global commons under international law has never been 
completely articulated, but it is generally a comparatively recent one used to 
generically refer to the places, spaces and other factors that are beyond the 
jurisdiction and control of states.9 There has been an extensive debate over 
similar notions under international law; for example, res communis such as the 
high seas, or the common heritage of mankind （CHM） represented by the 
deep seabed and its resources. Strictly speaking, however, global commons are 
different from these.
 To establish the background for examining the position and status 
of the Arctic Ocean as a global commons, it is valuable to briefly consider 
and classify some apparently similar but essentially different concepts often 
used in the context of international law and international relations.10 The 
above-mentioned places and spaces often referred to as global commons 
do not necessarily have comparable historical developments or institutional 
frameworks. In the discourse of international law, for example, similar notions 
and phrases such as ‘common spaces’,11 ‘areas beyond national jurisdiction’,12 
‘le domaine public international’ （in French）,13 and ‘internationalised areas 
（territories）’14 were already established before the term global commons 
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came into use. In addition to these terms or perhaps in combination, the 
international community started using various concepts derived from domestic 
law and economics.15
 Although the common features of the places and spaces called global 
commons are open for debate, one may summarise them into the following 
four points: （1） Everybody has freedom of access （use） to these places and 
spaces; （2） Nobody is allowed to appropriate them; （3） They are reserved for 
the use of peaceful purposes; and （4） They are somehow under control and/or 
regulation of international institutions.16 Because these places and spaces also 
have various practical differences, however, the following section will briefly 
classify each distinct and specific feature against its historical background.17
１．The high seas as res communis
 As a well-founded general principle of international law, the freedom 
of the sea or of the high seas in particular is one of the oldest. This essentially 
signifies open and free access/use by anybody, but no appropriation. Early 
international lawyers such as Hugo Grotius conceptualised and advocated 
equal use and non-appropriation to principally ascertain free trade, as they 
regarded the high seas as res communis18 whose origin lies in Roman law.19
 This idea is grounded on the principle of maintaining maritime order 
based on the dual institution of wider high seas and narrower territorial 
seas. In order for the high seas to be open for stable use, global society has 
long supported their highly public character. As there has been no unified 
management body for the whole maritime space, this freedom is in principle 
a passive one that intends to guarantee no regulation or interference from 
others. It has also become customary international law and has been 
enshrined in maritime agreements such the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas20 and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
（LOSC）.21,22
 The peaceful use of the high seas is normally interpreted to be within 
the framework of the principle of general prohibition of the use of force under 
the United Nations Charter.23 
２．The frozen territorial disputes in Antarctica
 Antarctica has been under the control and management of the Antarctic 
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Treaty （AT） of 1959, which has the following four major principles: （1） 
The guarantee of peaceful use （non-militarisation）; （2） The freedom of 
and international cooperation for scientific research; （3） The prohibition 
of nuclear tests and the disposal of radioactive waste material; and （4） The 
frozen territorial claims and/or territorial disputes.24 By the mid-twentieth 
century, Antarctica was at danger of becoming the target of claimant states, 
but it is now under a sui generis legal regime called the Antarctic Treaty 
System （ATS）, which governs the stable use of the continent as well as its 
surrounding maritime area. It also accommodates the state parties’ interests in 
natural resources, living or non-living, as well as environmental protection.25 
 As territorial disputes among the claimant states have been shelved 
since their entry into the AT, the ATS has successfully developed its 
governmental function through the preservation and management of living 
and non-living resources and the protection of the environment. This success 
has been attained by both internal and external accommodation26 of state 
interests and community interests. Although not an international organisation 
strictly speaking, the ATS provides good governance of Antarctica not 
only for the national interest of state parties, but also for the public interest 
of the international community in terms of science, the environment and 
ecosystem.27 
 What is remarkable about the ATS is its considerable influence on the 
governance of outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies, and 
the deep seabed in terms of global interests in maintaining peace and order 
for the benefit of public interest.28
３．The Common Heritage of Mankind （CHM）29
 Outer space and celestial bodies including the moon have also remained 
in the public domain for some time. This is due to human efforts to keep 
these spaces and objects from being appropriated by a handful of powerful 
states as a reflection of the arms race during the Cold War era and to reserve 
them for peaceful purposes as well as free and equal access. The international 
community has utilised the multilateral law-making process, including the 
UN, to adopt some significant instruments such as the 1963 UN General 
Assembly （UNGA） Resolution, titled the ‘Declaration of Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
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Space,’30 and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.31
 The Outer Space Treaty designates the exploration and use of outer 
space including the moon and other celestial bodies as ‘the province of all 
mankind’. This opens them to the freedom of use based on the principles of 
non-discrimination, equality and non-appropriation.32 Thus, the notion of 
peaceful use of outer space,33 among others, constitutes the basic framework 
for places of high public interest and the stable use of resources with a certain 
regulation of freedom against the historical background of the Cold War arms 
race.34
 The advancement of resource exploration and development turned the 
eyes of the international community to the preservation and sustainable use of 
natural resources and to the recognition of the ‘rights of peoples and nations 
to permanent sovereignty’35 over natural resources.36 In the 1970s, the world’s 
attention consequently focused on the environmental movement in the form 
of concerns and responsibilities for common resources and environmental 
protection. This trend is reflected in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm,37 the 1973 Washington Convention,38 and 
others. The major reason for this trend may be that the concept of ‘community 
interest’39 gradually started to develop globally from the values of sharing 
and commonality in the ideas of preservation of shared natural resources, 
environmental protection and of the common use of public domain. On the 
other hand, the rise of developing countries also promoted the support for 
establishing a New International Economic Order （NIEO） in the 1970s for 
their own benefit.40
 In the same vein, the concept of ‘the common heritage of mankind’ 
（CHM） was enacted for the first time in the LOSC （Part XI, in particular） 
and has been enshrined in a distinctively new legal regime for the deep 
seabed and its resources under international law. Besides the conventional 
principles of non-appropriation and peaceful use that are common with other 
public areas and spaces, the CHM’s distinct feature is that an international 
management regime called the International Seabed Authority41 unitarily 
governs the management of the place and its resources for the particular 
consideration of developing states’ interests and needs after considering the 
equitable distribution of their interest.42 Although Part XI of the LOSC 
had to be practically amended through the adoption of the 1994 Part XI 
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Implementation Agreement43 due to the strong opposition from developed 
states such as the United States, the idea of due regard to developing states’ 
special needs by way of the equitable distribution of gained interests in 
mining activities in the deep seabed44 materialised by the LOSC regime at the 
cost of the limitations of freedom of financially and technologically developed 
states.45 
 The Moon Agreement of 1979,46 which had been adopted in the 
UNGA prior to the 1982 LOSC, also stipulates the moon and other celestial 
bodies as CHM with the principles of non-appropriation, exploration and 
development on a non-discrimination and equality basis. It established an 
international institution and procedures for exploration and development, 
although the Agreement currently lacks wide support from the international 
community,47 the participation of superpowers in the field of outer space 
development and the current feasibility of the above-mentioned international 
institution. In this regard, CHM prescribed in the LOSC and the 1994 
Implementation Agreement is more concrete and practical than the Moon 
Agreement.
 Thus, the special characteristic of the CHM regime is that for the 
anticipation and prevention of free competition among developed states on a 
‘first-come-first-served’ basis, an international management regime such as 
the UN is strictly in charge of conducting the distribution of resources with 
due regard to the needs of developing states to benefit of humankind.
４．Global Commons48
 It was not until the World Commission on Environment and 
Development referred to the term global commons in the ‘Brundtland 
Commission Report’ submitted to the UN in 198749 when the term became 
recognised in the international community. The Report emphasises a paradigm 
shift ‘from one earth to one world’50 in the context of the environment, 
advocating the importance of enabling sustainable development under certain 
international institutions of surveillance, development, and management to 
ascertain common interests between states in the shared ecosystem and areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. The global commons mentioned in the Report 
generally refers to the oceans, outer space and Antarctica,51 while the common 
agenda for these comprises the maintenance and preservation of resources and 
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ecosystem as well as the need for international cooperation.52
 A series of related resolutions adopted in the UNGA consequently 
led to the declaration of global climate change as a ‘common concern of 
mankind’.53 Although it lacked the concreteness and substance of the CHM, 
there began to grow the sense that climate change and the ozone layer in 
conjunction with the global atmosphere together form legal interests protected 
by all the states.54 Therefore, the idea of a common concern for mankind 
in the context of protecting the environment has increasingly materialised 
and been enacted due to its universality and the necessity of common action 
through agreements such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer,55 the 1992 UN Climate Change Convention and 
the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity. The trend is based on 
the global agenda that needs a broad, common approach regardless of the 
traditional distinction between ‘within’ and ‘beyond’ the scope of national 
jurisdiction. It will generate a new value requiring a global initiative to go 
beyond the environmental context of the concept and phrase which remain 
within an agreement like the CHM.
 Therefore, the concept of common property normally refers to the 
areas beyond national jurisdiction such as the high seas and their superjacent 
space that are governed by multilateral agreements such as the High Seas 
Convention, the LOSC and the Outer Space Treaty. The living resources in 
these areas can be common property （or shared resources） upon catching and 
taking, but are differentiated from the CHM in reference to mineral resources 
in the deep seabed under specific regimes or from common natural resources 
which are subject to a right shared by a limited number of states.56 In fact, this 
concept’s shortcoming involves the depletion of resources and aggravation of 
the ecosystem and the environment: resource management would be hindered 
unless an effective protection of resources was ascertained by the cooperation 
of all states, for example, high seas fisheries being disrupted by the conduct of 
a free-rider and a third party.57 
５．Summary 
 Often regarded as a res communis, the high seas are not under a unitary 
international management regime but principally under flag ship jurisdiction 
in accordance with the freedom of use and the non-appropriation principle. 
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With the continuous momentum of expansion in terms of governance, the 
ATS is a sui generis legal regime to promote international cooperation for 
scientific research and observation under the principles of peaceful use and 
denuclearisation after shelving the territorial disputes among state parties. 
The CHM is the fundamental legal concept enshrined in international 
instruments such as the Moon Agreement and the LOSC to govern the moon 
and other celestial bodies or the deep seabed and its resources, respectively, 
under the unitary international institution in accordance with some common 
basic principles such as peaceful use and non-appropriation. Outer space is 
not considered CHM per se, but is subject to the principle of peaceful use, 
which is open for some interpretations. 
 Thus, a question arises as to whether the Arctic Ocean can be also 
regarded as a global commons due to its similarities to the Antarctic 
continent.58 This question will be addressed in the following section.
Ⅱ． The Assumption of the Arctic Ocean as a Global 
Commons
 The Arctic Ocean is the ice-covered maritime area characterised by a 
semi-enclosed sea largely surrounded by coastal states with a certain margin 
of its high seas under the application of the law of the sea, including the 
LOSC.59 Therefore, the geographical and legal conditions of the Arctic and 
Antarctic are quite different. It is noteworthy that Alfred T. Mahan also 
referred to ‘［t］he sea a great common’60 as early as 1890 when he wrote the 
book The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660－1783 . By mentioning the 
sea as ‘a wide common’, he intentionally characterised its most important 
function as ‘trade routes’.61 For this reason, some writers attribute the 
origin of the term global commons to Mahan. However, this may be over 
exaggerated, as the background and legal and political context of his time are 
quite different from today. A more careful look is helpful here.
 The term global commons has been often used recently, particularly 
in the United States and Japan. This follows the current trend in the United 
States in the context of security.62 However, against the background of 
environmental protection and globalisation, the term originally referred to 
the places, spaces and resources therein that are widely open for the common 
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interest of international society.63
 In the brochure ‘National Security Strategy of Japan’,64 formulated 
by the Abe cabinet in its meeting on 17 December 2013, for example, sub-
section 4, ‘Risks to Global Commons’ begins with a phrase stating that ‘In 
recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global 
commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and 
become more serious’ （emphasis added）.65 In this wording, the term global 
commons is represented by the sea, outer space and cyberspace. Traditionally 
speaking, ‘the sea’ as a whole is rarely regarded as global commons, since the 
territorial sea, for example, is not normally included. What is misguiding and 
unclear here is the following paragraph in the brochure:
  ‘［T］he Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for 
developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. 
While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant 
international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction 
among them.’66
The latter phrase does not clarify what sort of ‘friction’ could arise and for 
what reason. Moreover, whether this estimation of the situation is correct and 
can be shared by other states needs to be assessed. 
 As shown in its annual documents of 2014 and 2015, the Ministry of 
Defense （MoD） of Japan has analysed the Arctic Ocean as the place where 
‘［t］he strategic importance of the region is ... increasing’. It remains 
vigilant of some Arctic states including Russia, who are ‘promoting efforts 
to deploy new military capabilities for the purpose of securing their interests 
and defending their territories’.67 In its analysis of 2014, the MoD identified 
Russia’s ‘military superiority among other Arctic states, with deployment of 
dominant military capabilities’ in the region, whereas the MoD recognised 
China ‘showing intention to be actively involved in the activities’68 therein. 
It is assumed, therefore, that Russia and China are of particular interest for 
Japan’s concern with respect to the trend of security in the Arctic Ocean.69
 Considering that the Arctic Ocean is a maritime space of common 
interest for concerned states in the international community particularly 
in terms of protecting the environment and ecosystem for sustainable 
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development of the region, it is undeniable that it has some aspects of global 
commons in its original sense. However, it is open for debate whether Canada, 
Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States （the so-called 
Arctic Five）, who are directly concerned as littoral states of the Arctic Ocean 
as a semi-enclosed sea, all agree that the Arctic Ocean is a global commons 
in the original meaning.70 Regardless of the real intentions of these countries, 
recent public opinion and academic views show a steadily growing tendency 
that the Arctic Ocean should be considered a global commons and should 
be reconsidered as a globally influential place of the world’s interest in terms 
of energy and resources.71 In light of the current situation in which the so-
called ‘globalisation of the Arctic’ is gradually occurring, the Arctic Ocean’s 
future will be more at risk if certain factors become incompatible or in strict 
opposition. For example, the Arctic Five would like to confine the Arctic 
Ocean to their own internal matters, whereas the trend of the international 
community prefers a more globalised view and response.
Ⅲ．Good Governance in the Arctic
 Global climate change has caused recognizable environmental change in 
the Arctic. Thus, the littoral states in and around the Arctic Ocean, including 
the Arctic Five, are under the direct and most significant influence of shifts 
in regional and local stability and sustainable development. Under these 
circumstances, a question arises today regarding the type of governance that is 
necessary and preferable for the Arctic.72
 Regarding Arctic governance, the objectives, establishment and role 
of the Arctic Council （AC）73 are quite different from those of the Antarctic 
Treaty System （ATS）,74 which is in charge of Antarctic governance. The AC, 
which started to function in 1996 as ‘the leading intergovernmental forum 
promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, 
Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common 
Arctic issues’75 such as sustainable development and environmental protection 
in the Arctic, is not the only mechanism in charge of good governance of 
the Arctic. The legal framework governing the Arctic Ocean consists of a 
multi-layered network of the law of the sea, at the centre of which is the 
LOSC, relevant norms adopted in international organisations such as the 
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International Maritime Organisation （IMO） and the laws and regulations of 
coastal states in the Arctic Ocean.76 
 The coordination of internal and external interests of coastal states 
in the Arctic Ocean remains among the most important challenges. 
However, more states have become stakeholders for the following reasons: 
the geographical adjacency to the region; use77 of the Northern Sea Route 
（NSR） and the North West Passage （NWP）;78 and the economic and 
environmental factors involved【Map 2】. This is why the international 
community increasingly expects good governance based on a stable legal order. 
However, at issue is that the direction of governance has not necessarily been 
【Map 2】
Source: ‘The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030’, 2014, p. 14.
Anticipated future Arctic transit routes superimposed over Navy consensus assessment 
of sea ice extent minima. （United States Navy graphic）
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clarified: among the Arctic Five of the AC and the other Arctic states, there 
has been no agreement whether to focus on international cooperation or state 
sovereignty in the face of friction.79 This point is especially key in the field of 
security and exemplifies the diverse and complicated nature of security in the 
Arctic Ocean.80 
 In discussing security in the Arctic, one should note that multiple 
factors are of concern in the international community in this century. 
Besides conventional security issues such as military confrontation and arms 
races are concerns on other various notions of security and their responses, 
such as environmental factors resulting from climate change and maritime 
pollution, energy issues caused by the development of natural resources and 
environmental and human security factors related to human existence in 
the region.81 Therefore, it is suggested that the ‘US Navy Arctic Roadmap’ 
of 2009,82 for example, ‘conveys a strong commitment to cooperation 
with foreign militaries on non-military matters, such as search and rescue, 
maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
（HA/DR）’.83 Moreover, even within the AC exist the divergent motivations 
with respect to security. The Arctic Five are likely to first consider their own 
state sovereignty and national security, while the other three Arctic states aim 
principally at security in a wider sense and for international cooperation.84 
Even the Arctic Eight, the original signatories of the AC, do not necessarily 
share a common basis of security, as they do not form a single international 
institution for a political, economic or military purpose.85 Accordingly, the 
Arctic region will eventually need both a more comprehensive perspective 
of security suitable for the regional circumstances and a framework and/or 
mechanism to implement the perspective. 
 The issue of Arctic security currently needs to consider not only 
traditional security, which is concerned with the survival of sovereign states, 
but also global security, which is related to global interests, and regional 
security unique to the Arctic maritime area involving all concerned states. 
Traditional security will possibly continue, being centred on the conventional 
response in line with the reality of the US-Russia confrontation of nuclear 
states that persists in the post-Cold War period.86 Global security has 
increasingly become an urgent challenge requiring more opportunities for 
dialogue and cooperation, as such issues as transnational environmental 
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degradation and search and rescue （SAR） operations in the Arctic Ocean will 
need global cooperation beyond the wall of state sovereignty and will have 
varying influence on every country directly or indirectly. In fact, it is the wider 
global sense of security that is currently an essential but often ignored concept 
to considering the Arctic Ocean as a global commons.87
 Thus, it can be said that good governance of the Arctic will require 
transnational cooperation towards the preparation for and implementation of 
the mechanism encompassing both the national security of each concerned 
state as well as global and regional security.
Ⅳ． Towards the Concretisation of Good Governance in 
the Arctic
 The Arctic Five are reluctant to establish any international legal 
framework （or the internationalisation of the Arctic） other than the law of 
the sea, including LOSC, as they so declared at Ilulissat in 2008.88 In addition 
to the AC and its recommendations adopted by consensus, the international 
legal norms governing the Arctic include the laws and regulations of each 
coastal state in the Arctic region, the so-called soft law adopted in some 
international organisations and bodies such as the IMO and the International 
Association of Classification Societies （IACS）. For example, some guidelines 
concerning the navigation adopted by the IMO89 and IACS,90 or the methods 
of consultation and accommodation for harmonising domestic rules are 
relevant for operating the Arctic legal norms.
 Moreover, there is a further need for some normalising practice in 
addition to the Arctic Agreement on Search and Rescue of 2011 and the 
Arctic Agreement on Cooperation on Maritime Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response of 2013 adopted in the AC’s auspices. It is noteworthy 
that both the Maritime Safety Committee （MSC） and the Maritime 
Environment Protection Committee （MEPC） of the IMO adopted the 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters （Polar Code） in 
November 2014 and May 2015, respectively. At the same time, the MSC and 
MEPC amended the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
（SOLAS） and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships （MARPOL）, respectively, so that the Polar Code will become 
123
Waseda Global Forum No. 12, 2015, 109－150
mandatory for ships operating in polar waters.91 These processes illustrate the 
development of the de facto Arctic legal network to implement the regulations 
and rules for various purposes for the benefit of Arctic governance.92 For 
good governance of the Arctic region as a whole, the AC will be expected to 
make further efforts at reconciling environmental protection and sustainable 
development in the Arctic and to ensure the implementation of the relevant 
norm network, although the AC is not obliged to handle military and security 
issues under the Ottawa Declaration.93
 However, the Arctic Ocean cannot totally exclude challenges related 
with security matters in terms of Arctic governance. In fact, each Arctic 
state has a practical approach in terms of security, as the state practice of 
joint military operations between some friendly states such as the United 
States, Canada and Denmark has been gradually established. Because there 
are various attitudes among the Arctic states towards the involvement of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation （NATO）,94 Canada, for example, 
would keep a certain distance from NATO involvement. Now that Russia’s 
domineering existence and China’s growing activism in the Arctic Ocean 
are clear, the concept of security has diversified and become multifaceted, as 
evident in human and environmental security. This is another reason why the 
2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic （the Arctic SAR Agreement） was concluded under the 
auspices of the AC, largely for the benefit of all Arctic coastal states.95
 Due to the natural environment and geographical features unique to 
the Arctic region, the Arctic states have accumulated experience in which 
the coastal states’ navy or coast guard cooperate and work together through 
drills, notifications and information exchanges to effectively respond to a 
natural disaster or distress. Additionally, practical mechanisms （or multilateral 
agreements） related to security matters such as SAR and emergency response 
to maritime oil pollution have been developing under the AC’s auspices, as 
discussed above. It can thus be said that the notion of security in the Arctic 
Ocean is not merely in the narrow sense related to the military, but also in a 
broader sense. On the contrary, for good governance of the Arctic Ocean as a 
global commons, coordination among the concerned states using the broader 
concept of security will more easily lead to common interests in the region.
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Ⅴ． The Circumstances of the Coastal States and other 
Concerned States
１．Some Primary Concerned States in the Arctic Region
 The United States is the only state in the Arctic Five that has not yet 
acceded to the LOSC.96 The United States has its own interests in the Arctic 
mainly through the geographical location of Alaska,97 but its national strategy 
in the Arctic was less prioritised than in other Arctic states. Accordingly, 
it was not until the Obama Administration that the United States better 
clarified its foreign policy on the Arctic region, ‘National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region’, in 2013 and showed some guidelines leading to the concrete 
measures mentioned below to ascertain its national security interests as well as 
the freedom of navigation.98
 As coastal states, Canada and Russia have strengthened regulations 
concerning their coasts,99 but interestingly, they have contrasting policies on 
environmental protection and economic development.100 Canada treats the 
maritime areas along the NWP as its internal waters, which are subject to its 
stringent regulation under its coastal jurisdiction regarding environmental 
protection. Thus, the Canadian position is that protecting its own ‘Arctic 
sovereignty’ is its primary national interest, while it also seeks to ensure 
traditional and non-traditional security in parallel.101
 With the longest coastline on the Arctic Ocean among the Arctic Five, 
Russia has been active in developing and using the NSR, so that Russian 
control over its coast will lead directly to its national interests through its 
unique management style.102 On the other hand, Russia has shown a ‘more 
military-focused’103 security position in its 2013 official development strategy 
than in the 2008 document ‘Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the 
Arctic until 2020 and Beyond.’104 
 As non-Arctic states, China and South Korea were given the status 
of observer by the AC in May 2013 along with other Asian countries such 
as Japan, India and Singapore.105 They have been active in pursuing their 
own Arctic policy through their recent proactive commitments to the NSR. 
Japan has recently started devoting itself to materialising its Arctic plan by 
appointing an ambassador in charge of Arctic matters106 and by establishing 
some working groups on the matter in a cross-governmental format.107 
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However, Japan’s Arctic policy, which was publicised on 16 October 2015,108 
will need to be more concretised specific to Japan through contributions in 
other fields than its favourite and well-known area of scientific observation 
and environmental protection technology. As an observer state in the AC, 
Japan will immediately need to establish its Arctic policy to clarify its 
contribution to improve the AC’s governance.109 Japan is at a crossroads to 
decide whether it should continuously promote its scientific and academic 
contributions in terms of its national policy, or if it should expand the area of 
proactive contribution （and if so, in what terms?）.110
 Regarding economic development in the Arctic, the Japanese economy 
has shown considerable interest in offshore drilling and establishing a pipeline 
in and around the Arctic Ocean with a leading investment by the Japan 
Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation （JOGMEC）.111 However, the 
possible use of the NSR as an alternative route to the conventional southern 
one between Japan and Europe will take some time to become stable.112 The 
currently low oil price and persistently low economic incentive in shipping, 
navigation and insurance companies will be major factors hindering the 
development of the NSR for Japan against the background of unpredictable 
and changeable climate impact on the Arctic Ocean.
 The direction of Japan’s Arctic policy considered here is also dependent 
on its relations with the AC113 and other international organisations/organs, 
Arctic states such as the United States and non-Arctic states such as China.114 
Therefore, Japan should be prudent enough to behave itself so it will not be 
regarded as an unfair player with a unique but unwanted policy. Regarding 
security matters in the Arctic, Japan’s delicate nature within the AC will 
naturally require it to hold and pursue its policy with a perspective compatible 
with the AC and various conditions of the Arctic Ocean. Therefore, bilateral 
relations between Japan and the United States represented by the alliance will 
need to be adjusted to the multilateral conditions of the realities of the Arctic 
Ocean as well as the AC because the latter will decide the necessity and 
appropriateness of the former.
２．The Arctic Policies of the United States and China
 The following sections present an overview of （1） the recent situation 
in the United States, which has increasingly materialised its national strategy 
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on the Arctic with a view to better performing the chairmanship at the AC 
（2015-2017）, and （2） the case of China, which is actively engaged in Arctic 
development. The aim is to examine American Arctic policy and China’s 
position to adequately understand the latter in light of the Japan-US alliance 
and thus properly comprehend the security environment of the Arctic Ocean. 
The principal reason why only these two countries’ policies are discussed 
here is that their policies and state practices are the major factors influencing 
Japan’s Arctic policy in the context of the relationship between the Arctic 
Ocean and the concept of the global commons.
（1）The American Position115
 The Obama Administration presented the ‘Arctic Region Policy’ 
（NSPD 66/HSPD 25）116 issued on 9 January 2009 under the former Bush 
Administration and publicised its ‘National Strategy for the Arctic Region’ 
in May 2013.117 This stated that the United States would prioritise Arctic 
matters and proceed to responding internationally by taking domestically 
uniformed measures. In order to respond to a new Arctic environment due 
to climate change, the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which 
concretised the ‘National Security Strategy’ of May 2010,118 contains the 
following three major areas of effort: （1） To advance American security 
interests; （2） To pursue responsible stewardship of the Arctic region; and （3） 
To strengthen international cooperation.119
 The 2010 National Security Strategy appears too general and superficial 
to be concrete, but it simply demonstrates that while facing traditional 
demands of its further proactive attitude towards the Arctic, the United 
States considers national interests and international cooperation.120 This 
Strategy is noteworthy for the following two points: first, it stresses that 
retaining access to global commons is militarily important;121 and second, in 
the name of safeguarding global commons, the ‘international cooperation’ 
mentioned above is emphasised in the separate item called ‘［T］he Interest in 
the Arctic Ocean’ from maximising use of the shared domains of the ocean, 
air and space （explained to ‘exist beyond exclusive national jurisdiction’）.122 
Regarding the maritime area of the American Arctic, the ‘US Coast Guard 
Arctic Strategy’123 issued in May 2013 stresses that body’s responsibility for 
‘ensuring safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity 
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in U.S. Arctic waters’.124 This is based on the basis of the following three 
strategic objectives: improving awareness, modernising governance, and 
broadening partnerships.125
 President Obama states in the beginning of the 2013 National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region that the United States seeks an Arctic ‘that is stable 
and free of conflict’.126 The ‘Arctic Strategy’127 publicised by the Department 
of Defense （Pentagon） in November 2013 admits that to ensure national 
security in light of the current Arctic situation, it is impossible to help for 
itself, but is necessary to work together with allied states and partner states 
in accordance with international law.128 This will proceed to strike a balance 
between human security and environmental security. In other words, the main 
naval task in this region will possibly be in the field of non-traditional security 
matters, as has been suggested in the ‘U.S. Arctic Road Map’ of 2009.129 
In addition, the Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy contains content that responds 
jointly in a unified manner between Alaska and the Federal Government.130
 Moreover, the Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy advocates preparation for a 
regime to respond to various challenges by promoting the partnership and 
cooperation with allied states. It stresses international cooperation based 
on confidence-building through transparency and information-sharing, 
considering uncertainties such as future climate change and economic 
situations, the national budget and public opinion. The attitude in the 
Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy emphasising efforts towards international 
cooperation with a somehow low-key tone derives from regional 
characteristics of the Arctic which ‘reflect the relatively low level of military 
threat’.131 The Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy also reiterates that the Ilulissat 
Declaration of 2008 affirmed ‘no need to develop a new comprehensive 
international legal regime to govern’ the Arctic Ocean,132 as the legal 
framework provided by the LOSC is sufficient for managing of this Ocean.133 
The Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy accepts the AC’s ability to cope with the issue 
of ‘soft security’134 such as human and environmental security in addition to 
military security. Therefore, one can easily read from these official documents 
that the way of fully understanding the Arctic security situation merely 
from the viewpoint of military and the arms race runs counter to the current 
American Arctic Strategy and is thus a position the United States seeks to 
avoid.
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 In addition, the White House clarified a more concrete direction 
and process of its Arctic strategy in the ‘Implementation Plan for National 
Strategy for Arctic Region’ issued in January 2014. Furthermore, the United 
States has publicised through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration （NOAA） its positive attitude regarding the Arctic 
environment in ‘NOAA’s Arctic Action Plan: Supporting the National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region’ in 2014. 
 The common important points in these documents are: （1） National 
security; （2） Responsible stewardship; and （3） International cooperation. 
Among these, the last point attracts special attention. This is because its 
implication in the documents mentioned above appears to be United 
States’ emphasis on the partnership and approach on Arctic matters 
through international cooperation with other concerned states under several 
constraints （e.g. national budget, America’s relationship with neighbouring 
states, priorities given in relation with other national policy） that practically 
weaken its ability and intention to pursue its own unilateral policy.
 Furthermore, the ‘United State Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 
2030’135 issued in February 2014 is remarkable in that mentioning global 
commons, the US Navy specifies its mid- and long-term vision on Arctic 
policy from the viewpoint of its role and task with special reference to 
‘the need to develop strong cooperative partnerships with interagency 
and international Arctic Region stakeholders’.136 Three points are worth 
mentioning here. First, the Arctic Roadmap only singled out Canada 
as a security partner in North America.137 Second, the feasibility of an 
international route caused by climate change will depend on ‘a spirit of 
trust and cooperation’138 with the expectation of the Arctic region to be ‘a 
low threat security environment’.139 Third, the Arctic Roadmap stresses the 
position that the US Navy preserves ‘［a］ccess to the global commons and 
freedom of the seas’ as ‘a national priority’140 without explaining the term 
global commons. In this light, the following summarises the basic American 
position regarding the freedom of navigation:
  ‘United States’ policy since 1983 provides that the United States will 
exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms 
on a world basis in a manner that is consistent with customary 
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international law. The Navy will guarantee freedom of navigation in 
Arctic Ocean waters and help ensure the free flow of commerce on the 
global commons.’141
 From the analysis mentioned above, one may assume that the term 
global commons actually means the ocean in general and in the context 
of security. In the report of the US Congressional Research Service, titled 
‘Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress’ dated 4 
August 2014, the proposal ‘to establish and maintain a military presence in 
the high north’ is supported on the recognition that the Arctic is ‘a potential 
emerging security issue’.142
 Intriguingly, however, the term global commons disappeared from the 
‘National Security Strategy’143 issued in February 2015. Instead, the 
‘Shared Spaces’ comprise cyberspace, space, air and the oceans, to which the 
United States ensures its own access.144 The Arctic Ocean is described in the 
2015 National Security Strategy as one place where recent ‘unprecedented 
international cooperation’145 will be promoted. 
 The United States just started serving as Chair in the 2015 session of 
the AC146 and is expected to take leadership there as a leading Arctic state to 
govern the Arctic Ocean as a zone of international cooperation and peace. 
As a whole, it can be said that the Americans’ current interest in the Arctic 
inevitably lies in its promotion of international cooperation due to Arctic 
policy without the strong financial support from the apathetic US Congress.
（2）The Chinese Position
 Some commentators find that China, often referred to as a rising power 
or even a returning power,147 has been actively pursuing its Arctic policy.148 
This is seen in its strong interest in developing the maritime routes and 
in exploring energy resources in the Arctic. Many writers believe the steps 
taken by China will be a major factor influencing the security environment 
in the Arctic Ocean.149 There are actually some quasi-official views on 
China’s intention and Arctic policy, but the Chinese government has not yet 
publicised its official policy on the Arctic.150 As a number of views attribute 
this to China’s delayed process of finalising its policy, this may be a policy of 
intentional ambiguity for some reason. China’s attitude towards the Arctic 
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does not seem to resemble the one devoting itself to scientific research in 
Antarctica early on, as discussed below. Will China’s active behaviour become 
a threat to Arctic security?
 The present author will not dwell on this issue here, as his negative 
views on this point have been expressed elsewhere.151 It may suffice to 
mention some relevant points for why we should not unnecessarily exaggerate 
China’s proactive posture in the Arctic, but rather view this as opportunities 
for the Arctic.152 First, against the background of China’s recent rapid 
economic growth, one should pay more attention to China’s steady and 
pragmatic attitudes and achievements in the fields of scientific observation 
and cooperation, the enhancement of bilateral partnership with Arctic 
regional states through economic development and China’s participation 
in Arctic governance in the legal orders such as the AC and LOSC. Some 
believe these actions may be because China has always regarded the Arctic 
Ocean as a global commons, though it would not express this officially. 
Second, China seeks to enhance cooperation of scientific observation and 
economic partnership with Canada, Norway and Iceland simply because these 
countries have demands mainly for China’s economic ability and technology. 
This may be the only natural and inevitable consequence if one considers the 
current situation of China, who is, in fact, the largest economy in the world on 
purchasing power parity （PPP） evaluation.153 Third, it is reasonable to think 
that embracing China in the AC will be more beneficial for international 
cooperation to avoid excessive security response against China and not to 
amplify any possible unstable factors in and around the Arctic. Fourth, China 
may be playing a specific role in appealing for good governance of the Arctic 
Ocean in that its support of the idea of reserving the Arctic as a global 
commons can be interpreted as speaking for developing countries. It does so 
by checking the creeping jurisdiction and claims by some of the Arctic Five 
for extending their continental shelves, thereby preventing the erosion of the 
CHM at the centre of the Arctic Ocean.154
 It would therefore be pointless to confuse China’s activities in the Arctic 
with the situation of the South China Sea, where China has been assertively 
reclaiming its island territories, as both situations differ significantly.155 Thus 
far, there has been no evidence that China’s activities and behaviour in the 
Arctic Ocean are in contradiction with international law. It would be unfair 
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to magnify only the views leading to a threat to security and military tension 
in the Arctic region. Moreover, the concerned states should accurately and 
without prejudice examine the security situation in the Arctic in conjunction 
with the current American Arctic strategy and policy, as briefly described 
above.
Ⅵ．Seeking Japan’s Arctic Policy 
 It is pointed out that Japan started conducting scientific research and 
observation in the Arctic region since the early 1950s.156 It has not been long 
since the growing possibility of developing the NSR due to global climate 
change started attracting people’s attention in Japan. Its national interest in 
the future plan lags behind that of other countries.
 In fact, the ‘Basic Plan on Ocean Policy’157 adopted in April 2013 
identifies various challenges in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change 
such as an impact ‘on the global climate system and potential for use of Arctic 
Sea Route’.158 Therefore, the Plan states the following:
  Given the changes in the Arctic Ocean caused by climate change, 
Japan has been facing diverse issues to study and address, such as 
securing maritime transport, securing the safety navigation, promotion 
of research and survey activities, conservation of environment, 
and promotion of international coordination and cooperation. 
Comprehensive and strategic measures should therefore be promoted to 
tackle these issues.159
It was not until the ‘Relevant Ministries and Agencies Liaison Conference 
on the Arctic Ocean Issues’160 was established on 30 July 2013, when the 
arrangement of national policy concerning the Arctic region began. It has 
been reported that by the time between the autumn of 2013 and 2014, 
the government started strongly considering the construction of an Arctic 
Observation boat （or icebreaker）.161 The first meeting of the ‘Public-Private 
Partnership Conference concerning the Arctic Maritime Route’ was held 
under the initiative of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism （MLIT） on 30 May 2014 to share information and exchange 
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views.162 This Partnership Conference was a nation-wide forum of importance 
whose secretariat is in the section of maritime policy in the general policy 
bureau of the MLIT. Recently, more workshops and seminars concerning the 
Arctic and its maritime route are held in Japan to promote the partnership 
and exchange of the public and private sectors. 
 This tendency illustrates that Japan’s Arctic policy, though recently 
announced, will continue to be mainly pursued by projects on conventional 
scientific observation and survey and on future economic activities.163 
However, the following passage in ‘Japan’s Arctic Policy’ of 2015 is 
noteworthy.
  There is a risk that factors such as opening of new shipping route and 
the development of natural resources may become a cause for new 
friction among states. It is important to prevent moves to strengthen 
military presence in the region from leading to tension and confrontations. 
At the same time, while recognizing that these developments may 
become factors that change the international security environment, 
not only in the Arctic but for the surrounding states including Japan, it is 
necessary to pay close attention to moves by the states concerned and 
also to promote cooperation with the Arctic and other states.164 
What phrases such as ‘moves to strengthen military presence in the region’ 
and ‘for the surrounding states including Japan’ imply is not clear at this 
moment. However, one may assume that the background to this policy 
is connected with the recent legislative movement under the current 
administration. These phrases may be associated with the following two major 
factors that affect the current government’s realistic and proactive attitude 
towards Japan’s security: first, the Japan-US alliance; and, second, China’s 
assertive maritime activities in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be no apparent relationship between these two factors that may be 
discussed here. As was discussed above,165 the present author is of the opinion 
that, in considering Japan’s contribution in the field of Arctic security, due 
regard must be given to various relevant factors such as Japan’s capacity and 
potential under the pacifist Constitution and Japan’s bilateral and multilateral 
relationships with Arctic and other non-Arctic states.
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 In light of the current Arctic conditions, it is worthwhile to theoretically 
examine the relevance or irrelevance of the Japan-US alliance as Japan seeks 
to elaborate its Arctic policy in the near future. There may be a future case in 
which these two countries will have to face how to apply bilateral relations 
to Arctic matters with which multilateral and common interests are related. 
In this context, a fundamentally important question may arise as to how 
compatible the newly enacted security related legislations of 2015 are with 
exercising the collective right of self-defence required under the Japan-US 
alliance and with exercising the right of self-defence permissible under the 
Japanese Constitution. This question is, however, beyond the scope of this 
article, but must be answered on another occasion. 
 It would be highly doubtful that the Arctic states and concerned states 
which have made every effort to avoid a hard core issue of military security 
would welcome considering a military and national defence-related issue 
such as exercising the collective right of self-defence arising in the context 
of the Japan-US alliance, regardless of its theoretical meaning. Therefore, 
considering the question whether an Arctic matter in the context of a global 
interest can be necessarily connected to the bilateral relations of the Japan-US 
alliance would not contradict the current situation only if the consideration 
were made in the context of security in a non-traditional form.
 For the last few years, the enhancement and expansion of the Japan-
US alliance has been achieved through several different policy- and law-
making processes. In the first stage, one notices some landmark events in 
the Abe Administration’s initiative enabling the government to loosen the 
interpretation of the long-standing prohibition of exercising the collective 
right of self-defence under the pacifist Constitution. This is so it can exercise 
it to proactively support Japan’s close friend states such as the United 
States and to send Japan’s Self Defense Force （SDF） abroad to make a 
more proactive contribution even in time of war. These events are based 
on the decision of the ‘National Security Strategy of Japan’166 made by the 
government on 17 December 2013, the receipt of the report titled ‘Report 
of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security’167 
submitted on 15 May 2014 and the Cabinet’s decision ‘on Development 
of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its 
People’168 of 1 July 2014. 
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 The movement to deepen the Japan-US alliance did not stop here, but 
entered the second stage to materialise Japan’s commitment to the alliance 
in many ways. Among others, a series of Japan-US Defence Guidelines （i.e. 
1978, 1997 and 2015）169 are non-legal instruments, but political ones of a 
soft-law nature with extraordinarily huge impact in practice, particularly on 
Japan’s security and defence beyond the scope of the Japanese Constitution. 
After the ‘Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-
US Defense Cooperation’,170 revealed on 8 October 2014, the government 
removed the geographical restraint over the SDF’s activities. It also referred 
to the expansion of the bilateral cooperation even to ‘space and cyberspace’.171 
The ‘Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation’172 of 27 April 2015 
did not, in the context of the significance of the Arctic Ocean with respect 
to Japan’s security, provide new or large surprises, only because of the 
reconfirmation of the 2014 ‘Interim Report’. At least for the argument of this 
paper, it is fortunate and reasonable that similar to the Interim Report, the 
new Guidelines do not refer to the Arctic Ocean at all, but only to ‘space and 
cyberspace’.173 
 However, the third stage of this process has resulted in the current 
decision to solidify the bilateral alliance by enacting the security-related 
legislations of 19 September 2015.174 What had long been deemed totally 
impossible by the authentic interpretation of the government has just become 
possible from the change in its interpretation of the anti-war provision, 
Article 9, of the Pacifist Constitution. Accordingly, the non-existence of 
the words ‘Arctic Ocean’ may not guarantee its permanent exclusion from 
the forcefully expanded scope of application and operation of the Japan-
US alliance’s cooperation in the area of maritime security. This is because 
the abrupt change of constitutional interpretation may, from time to time, 
occur by a whim of the government in place under enormous pressure and 
the influence of the de facto supra-legal existence called the new Japan-US 
Defense Guidelines. These seem to have already altered the geographical 
scope of Japan and ‘the Far East’ explicitly prescribed under the 1960 Japan-
US Security Treaty.175 Japanese nationals as a sovereign nation must be 
continuously vigilant on this issue. 
 In summary, it would not be necessary to extensively apply the narrow 
concept of security which may encompass the case of the collective right of 
135
Waseda Global Forum No. 12, 2015, 109－150
self-defence based on the bilateral Japan-US alliance to the Arctic Ocean, 
or to view security matters in the Arctic through the narrow-sighted glasses 
of the bilateral alliance. To the contrary, it will be more practical for Japan to 
consider first the permissible scope of international cooperation under the 
Constitution as international cooperation on non-traditional security, or in 
response to the relevant maritime law and multilateral agreements mentioned 
above, including the AC. Moreover, one should carefully examine whether 
or not the consideration mentioned above will be, in the context of Arctic 
security, compatible with what the United States expects Japan to develop as 
the ideal bilateral alliance.
Conclusions
 This paper largely considered the following three issues: （1） The 
concept of global commons under international law; （2） Whether or not 
the Arctic Ocean can be a global commons; and （3） What Japan should do 
with its Arctic policy with special reference to security and Japan-US bilateral 
relations.
 Regarding the first issue, it can be said that the concept of global 
commons under international law is still under development and is not yet 
fixed in terms of scope, definition and potential. Global commons was only 
used temporarily to refer to some places of international concern within the 
context of environmental protection and sustainable development mainly for 
the sake of international cooperation for management. Therefore, this kind of 
vague notion should not be exaggerated or abused to camouflage or misguide 
the reality of security, among other things. This would do more harm than 
good. The notion of global commons does not in itself solve any security 
concern.
 With respect to the second issue, the Arctic Ocean should not be 
considered a global commons due to its original background of history, 
geography and legal conditions. The dominant views in the literature still 
seem to be more conservative and pacific in the sense that the concept of 
global commons has not emerged to cover and articulate the common spaces 
and areas in the world in the context of military and security but to refer 
to them in the context of public interests such as environmental protection. 
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Moreover, introducing this kind of catchy but controversial term in the 
fields of international law and international relations would only lead to 
misunderstanding the real situation in the Arctic region. As the Arctic Ocean 
has no common features of global commons, the notion of global commons 
does not apply to it. In addition, the worst consequence of introducing this 
concept is the inability for it and its analogy to solve the real problems arising 
in the Arctic, where in the post-Cold War era, regional peace and security 
have been successfully maintained.
 Considering the third issue, Japan should accelerate its work to 
concretise its contribution to Arctic policy without too much emphasis 
on security aspects, as Japan’s bilateral relations with the United States 
in particular should not unnecessarily affect the multilateral and bilateral 
relations with the Arctic and non-Arctic countries. Because the Arctic Ocean 
has recently attracted the world’s attention to security in an unnecessarily 
stirring manner, it is more practical and reasonable to focus on a wider 
concept of security with special reference to human and environmental 
security. Besides security issues, Japan’s role in the AC should be wide enough 
to encompass its internal and external tasks and responsibility as an observer 
state. In addition to its traditional scientific contribution in the Arctic region, 
Japan will have a capacity to play a catalyst role in interrelating the Arctic and 
non-Arctic states through monitoring the AC’s operation as well as the nexus 
between the AC and the outside community.
 It is possible to find various issues for discussion under international law 
that will not be comprehensible only from the viewpoint of environmental 
protection and sustainable development when one re-examines the Arctic 
Ocean in the context of global commons from a wider perspective of security 
（including the function of the Japan-US alliance）. In addition, it is this 
wider concept of non-traditional security that is worth considering carefully 
in the Arctic case with a view to ascertaining good governance in the region 
in the post-Cold War era and under the impact of climate change. This 
philosophy will also lead Japan to make the most of the fundamental spirit 
enshrined in the Constitution for the benefit of its foreign policy agenda, 
including Arctic policy. As a non-Arctic state, Japan should in advance 
scrutinise and classify what it should and should not do in the Arctic. The 
wider concept of security may be something that Japan must consider as it 
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formulates its Arctic policy. 
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